Since its transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, Vietnam has been under pressure to reduce the size of the state-owned sector. In this process, the private sector has emerged. In 1990s, restructuring of state owned enterprises (SOEs) through mergers and consolidations, halved their number from 12,000 in 1991 to less than 6,000 in 1994 (Webster and Amin, 1998) . Privatization during the following more than ten years reduced the total SOEs to roughly 2,176 in 2007 (Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM), 2007). However, the SOE reform did not mean to weaken their economic power. That the share of state sector in GDP was firmly increasing during this period reflects "Hanoi's consensus" on the "dominating role of state sector" as a fundamental characteristic of the "socialism-oriented market economy". Hence, there is no guarantee that the SOE reform has been well conducted and its assumed contribution to economic growth and poverty reduction is not well analyzed.
Introduction
Since 1986 Vietnam has made the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy. One of the most striking features of Vietnam's transition has been the steady growth of output (see figure (1)) and remarkable achievement of poverty reduction without widening inequality (Klump, 2007) . Source: Tran Van Tho et al. (2000) for data to 1990, post 1990 data from General Statistic Office (GSO) (2008, 2009) Vietnam's performance is marked by SOE reform and the emergence of viable private sector facilitated by a new legal framework for private enterprise.
When Vietnam was a centrally planned economy, government and SOEs (including cooperatives) were the only two sectors. All economic activity was planned and controlled by government. The labor and capital markets were no exception. Based on the overall plan laid down by the government, the number of workers as well as the capital stocks for each organization was determined by their respective administrative units. A salary budget was allocated to each organization and workers were paid according to a predetermined scale.
The inefficiency of the central planned system resulted in the collapse of many SOEs, forcing the government to embark on economic reform. Doi Moi (economic reform), unveiled in 1986, represented a significant step towards a market economy. One important feature during the reform was the gradual demise of SOEs and the gradual expansion of private firms. The number of SOEs dropped from some 12,000 to about 6,000 by April 1995 (Webster and Amin, 1998) . The state enterprise reform first gave the enterprises more autonomy and flexibility in their decision making. The real privatization of SOEs started in 1992. This was to be accomplished through sales of enterprise shares to employees on preferential terms, to domestic private and public investors, and to foreign investors on a limited basis. More than 10 years later, the total number of SOEs was roughly 2,176 in 2007 (CIEM, 2007) . 2007) . In 2007, the stock market value was accounted for 40% of GDP, far exceeding the 25-30% levels set by the Prime Minister. It is expected that the market capitalization value in 2008 would account for 50-60% of GDP (Vietnam Economic Time, 2008) . The Vietnamese government ensures to speed up the pace of privatization in order to meet the increasing demand of stock market. Currently, the number of listed companies just account for 2% of total joint stock companies now operational in Vietnam (Vietnam Economic Time, 2008) .
The SOE reform and the emergence of the private sectors significantly affected the quantity and quality of job creation in Vietnam (Klump, 2007) . By the end of 1996, Vietnam had 6,020 State enterprises employing some two million people. These comprised about 1,140 enterprises belonging to state corporations, 500 centrally-controlled state enterprises, and 4,380 locally-controlled state enterprises (Webster and Amin, 1998) . Along with the falling number of SOEs, the level of employment in SOEs has decreased dramatically since the launch of Doi Moi (O'Conner, 1996) . State sector employment in 1986 accounted for about 15% of total employment. Between 1986 and the mid-1990s, total state sector employment dropped by over a quarter (Liu, 2004) . During 1991 to 1999, employment share of SOEs dropped form 6.5% to 4.8% (Vo, 2000) . By contrast, employment in the (formal) private sector more than doubled between 1996 and 2000 (World Bank, 2001 ) and the number of jobs created by the private sectors was three times higher than those created by SOEs (Liu, 2004) .
However, the SOE reform did not mean to weaken their economic power. That the share of state sector in GDP was firmly increasing during the period of privatization (see Figure (2)) reflects 'Hanoi's consensus' on the 'dominating role of state sector' as a fundamental characteristic of the 'socialism-oriented market economy' (Ngoc et al., 2006) . Figure (2) shows that since 1990, the state sector's share in GDP had kept increasing until 1995 and standing constant for a quite long period of time. This discloses a fact that SOE restructuring programs only aims at strengthening the state sector. Especially, the year 1996 observed a series of conservative policies (Womack, 1997) . In June 1996, the Eighth Party Congress reemphasized the "leading role" of the state sector as a strategic task. 1 The state investment hence accelerated with a pace more rapid than any other period (see Figure ( 3)). 1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 Year Percent non-state state Source: GSO (1996) for 1990-94 data, and GSO (2008) for post-1994 data.
In summary, Vietnam has achieved an impressive record of GDP growth as well as industrial growth in the transition period. Accompanying this growth is some degree of ownership restructuring. This compositional change results from the decline of the number of SOEs, the emergence of the private sectors, and the movement of employment to private sectors resulted from absorbing retrenched SOE workers and private sector's job creation. This has prompted questions about whether or not as the case of other countries, ownership restructuring fuelled by privatization is an important source of growth. Another view would be that privatization is an important and main driver of poverty reduction. This view receives some support from Klump (2007) . In his study on pro-poor growth in Vietnam, he argues that "new legal framework for private enterprise, facilitated the emergence of private sectors and the movement of employment from informal to formal sector industry and services…significantly affected the quality and quantity of job creation in Vietnam" and hence "income growth and poverty reduction occurred in both urban and rural area" (Klump, 2007, p.120 The main objective of this proposed study is: to analyze the impacts of privatization on economic growth and to understand under what conditions, privatization would result in higher poverty reduction. 2 In this paper we focus on the optimum distribution of economic activity across ownership structure.
If labor and capital could relocate across sectors and types of ownership, what would be the optimal allocation of activities and the feasible level of domestic final demand? And hence, as privatization proceeds, what accounts for these differences in terms of job-creation households' expenditure and inequality? The paper also concerns some key economic policies namely privatization policy, foreign investment policy and national strategy for technological improvement and poverty reduction.
Background
Economists have recognized the impacts of ownership structural change caused by privatization on economic growth. The impact of privatization on firm-specific productivity growth was examined by Ehrlich, Gallais-Hamonno, Liu and Lutter (1994) . They focus on the effect of state versus private ownership on the rates of firm economic performance. Their model and empirical results show the link between ownership and firm-specific rates of productivity growth. They argue that, the shift from complete state to full private ownership can increase the long-run annual rate of TFP growth. However, the result shows that in the short-run, this effect is expected to be ambiguous theoretically. Megginson and Netter (2001) investigate the process of privatization. After being privatized firms raise its productivity, increase its investment and lower its prices. Consequently, the performance is improved and due to state firm produces only a fraction of GDP, they argue that such improvements translate into a gain in aggregate growth.
Another study is on impact privatization is on the increase of foreign-owned shares in domestic firms on economic performance of developing countries by Henry (2003) . He argues that the developing countries would benefit from opening themselves to investment from overseas. As the shares hold by foreigner increases, the whole economy growth averaged 1.1 percent points higher after liberalization than before.
Privatization, according to McMillan (2004) , is generally beneficial economically, particularly for transition economies, but not a sole driven force of improving economic performance. McMillan argues that state-owned firm depends on its economic environment for improving its performance. He points out that the experience of 'big bang' reform -such as privatization so fast -justifies the caution to 'avoid hubris' because some mistakes created new problem of state capture and underdeveloped institutions. However, Havrylyshyn (2004) offers two caveats, which firmly support to the arguments that (i) the benefits of privatization without a proper accompanying climate of open competition and the rule of law maybe very small or even negligible; and (ii) privatization has resulted in a strong concentration of ownership, "it created unintended consequences of speeding up privatization by co-opting insider and then may have been the most important error of reform advocates and certainly one area where humility is called for" (Havrylyshyn, 2004, p. 40) .
There is a paucity of studies on impact of SOEs reform and/or privatization on poverty reduction in Vietnam. Huong et al (2003) calculates the employment elasticity of growth and finds that during 1992-1997, the elasticity was highest in agriculture where productivity remained low. She argues that this is because agriculture absorbed jobless rural youth and workers retrenched by SOE reform, and hence agriculture growth made its effect on poverty reduction, mainly in the South of Vietnam.
In his study, Klump (2007) argues that privatization in Vietnam, and the emergence of private sector significantly affected the quality and quantity of job creation. Job creation along with income growth as a consequent of the reform process is combining factor inputs to shrink poverty. Although showing that there is a increasing trend of job creation in private non-farm sector, Klump do not certain about positive impact of privatization on poverty reduction without widening inequality.
This proposed study aims at making a contribution on literature of privatization and fill in the gap by studying on the translating impacts of privatization under various scenarios of mobility of labor into poverty reduction and inequality. The study also contribute to the literature of general equilibrium by applying new technique, which was first developed by of ten Raa and Mohnen (2002) , and its variant by Ngoc and Mohnen (2004) .
Methodology

The general equilibrium
We use a variant of general equilibrium (GE) model which was first developed by ten Raa and Mohnen (2001) when they propose a new way to locate the comparative advantages of two economies linked by international trade. Ten Raa and Mohnen (2002) also applied this kind of general equilibrium model estimate total factor productivity growth and decomposed TFP in to technical change and term of trade effect (2002) . Since then some researches have applied this kind of modeling in investigating competitive pressures on China in terms of income inequality and migration (ten Raa and Pan, 2005) . And recently ten Raa and Sahoo (2007) use this general equilibrium model to examine competitive pressure on the Indian households.
The model uses the input-output tables of the Vietnamese economy to measure the impacts of ownership restructuring on economic growth. The basic idea is that: if labor and capital could reallocate across sectors and types of ownership, what would be the optimal allocation of activities and the feasible level of domestic final demand? The basic idea of the efficient allocation of resources can be illustrated graphically in Figure 1 follows. attained by expanding vector f in its own direction, up to fc , where c is the expansion vector. In figure 1 this is achieved by three things. Production y is pushed to the production possibility frontier (the curved line), reallocated in favor of output 2, yielding point y * , and the pattern of trade is changed (exporting commodity 2 and importing commodity 1). The frontier of domestic final consumption, fc , is attained by the elimination of slack and the reallocation of resources across sectors. Expansion vector c is a negative measure for efficiency. If c = 1 , the economy is already at its optimum. If c = 1.1 , the economy's potential is 10% more than actual performance." (ten Raa and Mohnen, 2002, pp. 114-115) FIGURE 4. Movement toward the production possibility frontier and gain optimal net output In this study we set up a GE model for both an open and a closed economy, with fixed domestic endowments, and tradeable and non-tradeable commodities (only with open economy mode). We assume the Leontief functions for the technologies and preferences. The efficient allocation of resources is obtained by pushing the economy to its frontier by maximizing the level of domestic final demand.
In our model privatization is an optimal choice of ownership structure. We do not analyze the ex post privatization but the ex ante one. The reason for doing this comes from the fact that privatization during almost two decades in Vietnam still reflects 'Hanoi's consensus' on the 'dominating role of state sector', hence there is no guarantee that the SOE reform has been well conducted and its assumed contribution to economic growth and poverty reduction is not well analyzed.
By investigating the optimal choice of privatization and its impacts on poverty reduction we assume that future privatization is happened under the condition that trade is taken as exogenously fixed at actual observed levels for all commodities. Reasons for doing this are as follows:
(i) Some role could always be given to international trade as a means to improve equality and reduce poverty; hence in an open economy mode poverty is under a dual-impact of privatization and international trade. Close economy mode, by its nature, helps us to isolate international trade and therefore impact of privatization on poverty could be measured in a more accuracy way.
(ii) If we allow for free trade and perfectly elastic foreign demand, the economy would specialize in production of few commodities for export and import all other tradable commodities for domestic demands. Since the assumption that
Vietnam can specialize only on production and export of some particular products is very week, we prefer pursuing the analysis in the context of a closed economy.
Factor inputs
Factor inputs are capital and labour, which are available by 69 sectors of the input-output Both capital and labour are also modeled as being full mobility moves across sectors and types of ownership. Ideally, it is worth to test the model at which capital is modeled as being sector-specific as in short-run, capital stocks are sector specific and quite immobile (such as machine buildings or lands are not to be assigned easily from one to other industries).
However, by assume the non-mobility of capital across sectors, the constraints are increased by a number of sectors. Thus when the number of variables stays, an increase in number of constraints could then leads to an increase in possibility of co-linearity (matrix singular) and/or (under the high rigidity of mobility) an increase in possibility of trivial solution.
These technical difficulties lead us to the choice of non-capital-specific model.
There is evidence that poverty measures are sensitive to factor endowments; as poor people seem to be less educated, qualified and equipped than rich people. Taking this point into account, in this scenario, we consider different categories of labor in this mode. For each type of ownership, labor is decomposed into four types depending on skill levels namely technicians, high skilled, low skilled and unskilled workers.
Hence, we assume top down hierarchy movement of labor across skill levels. This approach follows ten Raa and Pan (2005) , and the we define the rule of labor movement as the following: (i) technicians can do their own job and also capable of doing high skilled, low skilled and unskilled works; (ii) high skilled workers can do their own job as well as low skilled and unskilled works; and (iii) low skilled workers can do their own job as well as unskilled works; and (iv) unskilled workers can only perform their own jobs.
According to ten Raa and Pan (2005), the labor constraints for each type of ownership i = 1,.., 5 could be written as follows:
(1)
where: In equation (1) the first constrains demand for technicians. The second constrains demand for high skilled workers as well as the redundant technicians. The third constrains demand for low skilled workers as well as the redundant high skilled workers and technicians. And the last constrains demand for not only unskilled workers but also the redundant technicians and high skilled and low skilled one for who are not employed at the three top levels. In the optimum allocation, the three constraints pick up the shadow prices. The shadow price of unskilled workers (the Lagrange multiplier associated with the last constraint) could be used as a based wage. The shadow prices of the first, the second and the third constraints are technician's premium and high skill premium and low skill premium. As the technical could do any of jobs, hence the wage of a technician will be the sum of based wage and the other three premiums. In case the first constraint is not binding, the technician premium is zero but the wage of a technician still be the base wage plus the high skill and low skill premiums.
This shows that wages will increase by skill.
The models
There are two modes are modeled, namely mode I and mode II.
Mode I. In Mode I we do not differentiate between types of ownership. This means that the dimension of activity level vector s 1 is [# of sectors].
The model works as follows. The primal program is:
(2) max s 1 ,c 1 e ! fc 1 subject to
where the endogenous variables ( s 1 , c 1 ) and all other variables and parameters are defined as follows [with dimensions in brackets]: Associated to this primal program is the following dual program:
(2) min p,r ,w!0 rM + wN subject to
The variables in the dual program are the shadow prices p of commodities, r of capital, w of labor, and ! of foreign debt (the exchange rate). Since the commodity constraint in the primal program has a zero bound, p does not show up in the objective function of the dual program. p is normalized by the second dual constraint, essentially about unity.
Mode II. In Mode II, we apply the 5-type-of-ownership split to all # of sector of the inputoutput tables. Now each production sector will be split into five sub-sectors corresponding to five types of ownership. Therefore, the dimension of activity level increases to [# of sectors times # of ownership types]. The primal program is the variant of the equation (1) as follows:
(3) max s 2 ,c 2 e ! fc 2 subject to 2. As U split and V split exist only with respect to the number of industries and types of ownership, hence U split and V split matrices have to be unsplited with respect to different levels of skill. Therefore in mode II instead of extend the number of activities even further towards different levels of skill, we increase the number of labor constraints on labor by level of education/skill, allowing more educated workers to work in less education-requiring jobs.
3. M was computed by multiply the total observed capital stock by capital utilization rate.
4. N was computed by divide the total labor employment by labor utilization rate, which is available by skill levels.
Data
The study requires data complied from several sources. obliged to make the assumption that these inactive sub-sectors will not be activated at the optimal solution in which the economy operates at the production possibility frontier. the optimal reallocation of labour is quite consistent with the distribution of the highest labour productivity, but not in all sector the movement of labour across sector and ownership types is a reflection of the actual labour productivity. There is a question that how the optimal level of technician's and high skill wage reflect the real wage rate. Table 2 shows the real wage rate based on the reports from various Department of Labour, Invalids and Socio Affairs (DOLISA) in several provinces across
Results
Impact on economic growth
Vietnam. If we assume that the base wage and low skill premium at optimal level are the same at the observed level. Comparison of optimal and observed level of wage rate is shown in table 2. As shown by table 2, except from low skilled and unskilled wages, at the optimal level, both wage rates of high skill and technician are significantly increased. (4) shows correspondence contribution to total GDP by 5 types of ownership. At the optimal allocation, state center owned firms produce less value added than at the observed level. Whereas the role of state-local owned firms become more important as their value added at optimum increases remarkably. Its contribution to total GDP rise from 9 percent at observed level to 23 percent at the optimum. Private firms seem loss its importance at the optimum as their value added is expected to fall sharply after optimal allocation of resources. While play a main role of contribution to GDP at 45 percent (at observed level), private firms' contribution to total GDP, due to its less efficiency in production, become lowest at optimum allocation of resources (5 percent) . Surprisingly, 100% foreign invested firms produce much less value added than before and hence lowers its role to the lowest group (drop from 18 to 15 percent). Vietnam economy, at the optimal allocation of resources, relies heavily on join venture firms by almost more than 43 percent of GDP generated -the role, which played by private firms at the observed level.
Impact on job creation
The Vietnam Development Report 2000 shows that "sustained poverty reduction over the coming years must focus on three critical areas: creating opportunity, ensuring equity and reducing vulnerability" (World Bank, 1999, p.39) . In this proposed study, poverty analysis will be focus one of these three critical areas: creating opportunity. To measure the contribution of privatization to poverty reduction, the model keeps track on different scenarios of the mobility of labor. FIGURE 6. Framework for attacking poverty (Source: World Bank, 1999) Creating Opportunity has number of dimension. In this paper, we focus our analysis in net job-creation (defined as the different between optimal and observed levels of labor employment). Table (5) shows the total job created under mode I where we don't consider privatization and under mode II where privatization is taken. It is quite interesting that privatization leads to more job creations in mode I (820,289 job created) but results in job loss in mode II (more than 10.5 million of jobs). More over under mode II, total job losses due to shedding of unskilled and low skilled workers is greater than total job created due to the needs for additional high skilled workers and technicians. This resulted in total job loss of 10,506,332. It could be understood that Vietnam's economy could be restructured for accelerating growth by allocating more of her resources into high value added sectors (skill-intensive and capital intensive sectors) and hence has to be shedding jobs in low value added sectors such as agriculture and forestry where many of the unskilled used to work in. Data from GSO of Vietnam shows that, even accounted for 67 percent of employment in 1998, share of agriculture in total employment now is only 49 percent (GSO, 2011) . This trend is due to the process of industrialization and urbanization, which has been gaining momentum during the last ten years. Table ( A.5) of the appendix shows that under mode II, the sectors has been shedding jobs are low value added sectors which could come from three groups: agriculture-related sectors, low-tech manufacturing sectors less efficiency service sectors. It is quite interesting that job loss could be happened also at some hi-technology sectors such as electronic, car and motor manufacturing. These sectors dominated by foreign owned firms have been long protected by Government's protection policy. However, it is now recognized that many foreign owned firms are doing transfer pricing and hence contribute less and less to the GDP of the nation (Ngoc, 2009 ).
The multi-sectoral integrated activity analysis results in optimal level of labor employment by skill and by types of ownerships. Hence we could calculate net job-creation by types of skill and types of ownership. (6), Vietnam economy, at optimum allocation, much labor moves from private and 100% foreign owned firm into state sector and joint venture firms. But in fact total job losses are still 10,506,332. Even a larger number of job are created by state and join venture firms which could helps to absorb the out-of-job workers in private and 100% foreign firms, it could not help to offset the huge number of job losses due to shedding workers from private firms and 100% foreign firms. Therefore, even making a contribution to the better performance of the economy in terms of welfare improvement (as discussed in section 5.1), privatization under more flexibility of factor movement does not helps to accelerate the level of job creation across sectors. This means there is a trade off between growth and creating opportunity: if Vietnam want to growth faster from it current labour force structure, it could leads to the result that, the economy have to shed a large amount of low skilled and unskilled workers. In fact, that kind ownership restructuring does not contribute to a higher job creation.
Where these newly unemployed labour could move? According to GSO of Vietnam, in 2009, jobless rate was estimated at 5.1 percent (2.3 percent in urban area and 6.1 percent in rural area), which is much higher than the official unemployment rate of 2.9 percent in 2009. Since Vietnam has a thriving informal economy where the jobless can take refuge, this led to the growth in the size of informal sector worker during this period. Most new entrants within the labor market that are unable to find jobs in the formal sector or laid-off workers will not become unemployed, but rather they will end up working in the informal sector (Cling et al., 2010) . Employment in the shadow economy is quite high in other developing countries, such as Brazil and India, which comprises of nearly half of total employment, and nearly threequarters in Indonesia (The Economist, Jun 2010). 3 
Conclusions
Throughout more than 20 year of "Doi Moi" (Renovation), Vietnam economy has still under pressure to reduce the size of the state-owned sectors. Privatization, during last 20 years of renovation has reduced not only total SOEs but also the labor endowment of SOEs. However, privatization seems not to weaken SOE economic power as the share of state sector in GDP is quite stable and the share of state sector in total investment is still high.
This paper examines how the privatization under ownership restructuring could contribute to economic growth and hence accelerate poverty reduction in Vietnam. The analysis shows that privatization does contribute to welfare improvement. As privatization is examined at the optimal allocation of resources, roles of different types of ownerships could be drawn from.
First, the analysis shows that privatization, as it was happened so far, does not mean to weaken the economic power of state sector. At the optimum, the role of state-center firms slightly weakens but state local enterprises becomes much more important with its attainable contribution to GDP achieves at 23 percent. Role of private sector and 100% foreign invested firms become weaker at the optimum as their attainable contribution to GDP declines sharply. Main driving force of welfare improvement is join-venture firms as its attainable share in GDP is 43 percent. This conclusion is a source of policy implication for ownership restructuring strategy:
 The presence of state-owned firms should be continued and particularly enhance the role of local-state owned one. In fact as it was analysed in section 5.1 (p.16), shifting of resources lines in the different in factor productivities according to ownership of production. Hence, if policy measure could be made to increase the factor productivity in the state-owned enterprise, it is not need to do entirely the privatization. However, this would need an comprehensive policy measure as efficient management, particularly, in resource management, is an chromic disease of the state management in Vietnam.
 100% foreign invested firms might not be fully encouraged, rather there should be a selection of foreign invested license. Recent study by Bui Trinh (2010) shows that foreign invested firms contribute to trade deficit of Vietnam as their intermediate demands for production are mainly imported goods when most of them have reported loss to the tax department. According to Bui Trinh (2010), Duc (2010) , and Nghia (2010) , reason of loss-report from foreign invested firms is that they have manipulated "transfer pricing skill" which hard to be controlled by the tax department. However, as it has been widely accepted, the presence of foreign firms could lead to positive externalities for local firm, such as enhancing interactive learning through technological change or knowledge management; creating an competitive pressure on economic environment. In fact, many domestic firms have benefited from plugging into the global value chain through backward linkages with high-tech manufacturing sectors. Therefore, a oriented foreign investment accommodative policy, which focus on backwards linkage through supporting industries, is worth to do.
Second, the analysis also shows that privatization does not contribute to job creation. Further analysis on different types of skills shows that at the optimum, demands for high skilled labor : technicians is 4 : 1. This prompts the policy implication for technical and vocational training strategy. According to MOLISA (2005) , the training recipe between technical vocational training-technical high school -college, university level in Vietnam was 2.8 : 0.9 : 1. This shows that in order to have good labor force availability for economic development, Vietnam needs to change her current status of vocational raining to match the demands of the national economy, at which the optimum recipe of 4 : 1 is a reference. 4
Last, the analysis also shows that at the optimum, more value added don't associate with more job creation in general, as shifting of resources lines in the different in factor productivities, thus lead to the need for more high skilled worker and technicians which are scare in Vietnam. As a lesion from ASEAN tigers, advantage of low-cost labour will sooner or latter not be an intensive for firms' investment decision in labour-intesive sectors, as wage rate is continuously increasing. Therefore, if labour quality improvement could not be made, the current skill situation of Vietnam's labour force will be a 'bottle neck' for Vietnam economic growth in the near future. The optimal activity levels of DFD 
Appendix 2. The results
Mining for rocks, stone, sand and gravel
Other none-metallic minerals
Crude oil, natural gas (except exploration)
Processed, preserved food stuff
Processed, preserved fruits and vegetables --------6.06
12
Alcohol, beer and liquors
Cigarettes and other tobacco products
Processed seafood and by-products Source: Cling et al. (2010) 
